


Cases study: Road equipments facing surges in rough environment.




Presented by:
Vincent Crevenat
Director of Engineering
Citel

Case 1




Case 1


Terminal equipment (radar, CCTV, TCD etc...)




Case 1 (before in CT)




Case 1 (before in CT)




Case 1 (before in CT)




Case 1 (before in CT)








Proper connection (in CT)




Ground connection serial converter (in CT)




Case 1 (before in pole enclosure)




Case 1 (before in pole enclosure)




Case 1 (proposed changes)




Proper connection



In house tests




In house tests




In house tests


Shot number	Test setting	Tested port	Wave shape	Charging voltage (V)	peak current (A)	peak residual voltage (V)	long residual voltage	approximate stress duration (μ s)	status after shock	record	Note
1	DLA + good wiring	1	50/300	2740	60	/		/	OK	/	
2		1	50/300	3000	82	14.4	14.0	480	OK	50	
3		1	50/300	4000	107	16.0	14.0	510	OK	51	
4		1	50/300	6000	160	18.0	15.0	590	OK	52	
5		1	50/300	10000	274	25.0	17.0	560	OK	53	
6		1	50/300	15000	412	27.6	22.0	676	OK	56	
7		1	50/300	20000	556	29.2	24.0	690	OK	57	
8		1	50/300	25000	700	27.6	26.0	700	OK	58	
9		1	8/20	2740	1300	/	/	/	OK	/	
10		1	8/20	2740	1300	30.0	30.0	20	OK (after reset)	59	
11		1	8/20	3000	1480	28.0	20.0	20	OK (few com errors)	60	
12		1	8/20	3000	1480	32.0	19.0	20	OK (few com errors)	61	
13		1	8/20	4000	1960	44.0	20.0	20	OK (after reset)	63	
14		1	8/20	6000	2900	41.2	24.0	25	OK	64	
15		1	8/20	10000	4800	47.0	28.0	25	OK	65	
16		1	8/20	12000	5840	60.0	32.0	27	NOK	66	I *2 from plot
17	DLA + min wiring	2	50/300	3000	68	16.4	16.4	450+	OK	69	
18		2	50/300	6000	140	22.4	22.4	450+	OK	70	
19		2	50/300	10000	258	24.4	24.4	450+	OK (after reset)	72	
20		2	50/300	20000	528	33.2	30.0	450+	OK	73	
21		2	50/300	25000	664	36.6	36.6	450+	NOK	74	
22	DLA	2	50/300	25000	664	90++	90++	450+	Explosion	75	



In house tests



In house tests




In house tests


When the device is subject to surge stress and when wiring does not include SPD, withstand can be estimated 100A but no information on this is available.

- When the device is subject to surge stress and when wiring is not optimised including SPDs, the maximum Current in the test circuit was 528A 50/300


- When the device is subject to surge stress and when wiring is optimised including SPDs, the test Current in the test circuit was 4800A 8/20.



Case 2




Case 2




	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225	226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300	301	302	303	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311	312	313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	321	322	323	324	325	326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350	351	352	353	354	355	356	357	358	359	360	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372	373	374	375	376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386	387	388	389	390	391	392	393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400	401	402	403	404	405	406	407	408	409	410	411	412	413	414	415	416	417	418	419	420	421	422	423	424	425	426	427	428	429	430	431	432	433	434	435	436	437	438	439	440	441	442	443	444	445	446	447	448	449	450	451	452	453	454	455	456	457	458	459	460	461	462	463	464	465	466	467	468	469	470	471	472	473	474	475	476	477	478	479	480	481	482	483	484	485	486	487	488	489	490	491	492	493	494	495	496	497	498	499	500	501	502	503	504	505	506	507	508	509	510	511	512	513	514	515	516	517	518	519	520	521	522	523	52
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Case 2




Reports from a customer stated the Impath Encoders are failing at multiple locations. The Impath Encoder is only device failing through serial (RS422) and video (BNC), the serial ports are protected by CITELE surge protective devices (SPD's). The CCTV camera is 30ft from Cabinet with CITELE SPD's then a run of 200-700ft to a second cabinet with CITELE SPD's and the Impath Encoder.


Case 2



Case 2



Case 2



Before

After




- Reduced failures once implementation our recommendation to bond all equipment's.
- Reduce failures by limiting wire loops in the cabinets which builds up coupling

Case 2



Before

After




- Reduced failures once implementation our recommendation to bond all equipment's.
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Case 2



- Reduced failures once implementation our recommendation to bond all equipment's.
- Reduce failures by limiting wire loops in the cabinets which builds up coupling

Case 2



- Reduced failures once implementation our recommendation to bond all equipment's.
- Reduce failures by limiting wire loops in the cabinets which builds up coupling

In house tests

RS232 Port Test:



BNC Port Test:



In house tests: No SPD

RS232 Test:

Impath Network Decoder	Shot #	PIN RS232	Sample #	No SPD	Generator		Decoder		Plots	Comment
					kV	kA	(A)	(V)	Lecroy	
27.7	1	3 & 2	4	N/A	2.7	1.1				Small arcing at port A, no boot when power applied, did an internal reset system started.

BNC Coaxial Test:

Coaxial Immunity Test without / SPD	Sample #1	Sample #1	Sample #1
Voltage Nominal Generator	2.7kV	4kV	4kV
Generator Peak Display	0.15kV / 1.38kA	0.21kV / 1.37kA	1.23V / 1.79kA
Oscilloscope Results	N/A	N/A	N/A
Oscilloscope Plot Number	N/A	N/A	278
Status	Pass	Fail	Fail
Comments	Video display works after 1 impulse surge test with no damage.	During test small arc at BNC input of encoder with no physical damage to PCB. Retest video, fails to display live stream images.	We removed all chassis to test at PCB level to trace arcing. As generator impulse surge large arc destroyed IC U29 and surrounding capacitors.


3: Risk Assessment

- This risk assessment is the approach taken by IEC ,IEEE and NFPA 780. Providing an analysis to determine risk to a standing structure when it comes to lightning and surges.
- This calculation is used to determine if lightning protection is needed.

Factors:

- Height of structure
- Surrounding area
- Location of lightning flash activity
- Environmental risk


Mississippi Norrel Road and I-20 RAMP



Isolated structure on hilltop


Mississippi Norrel Road and I-20 RAMP





Risk assessment

The pole is acting as a prominent part.



Model 2

Note: For a structure where a prominent part encompasses all portions of the lower part, $A_e = \pi 9H^2$

NFPA 780

Pole 16 meters (50')

Coefficient Values: C1; Environmental

Table H.4.3 Determination of Environmental Coefficient C_1

Relative Structure Location	C_1
Structure located within a space containing structures or trees of the same height or taller within a distance of $3H$	0.25
Structure surrounded by smaller structures within a distance of $3H$	0.5
Isolated structure, no other structures located within a distance of $3H$	1
Isolated structure on a hilltop	2

Relative Structure Location	C1
Structure located within a space containing structures or trees of the same height or taller within a distance of $3H$	0.25
Structures surrounded by smaller structures within a distance of $3H$	0.5
Isolated structure, no other structures located within distance of $3H$	1
Isolated structure on hilltop	2

Coefficient Values: C2 & C3; Structure & content

C ₂ — Structural Coefficients			
Structure	Roof		
	Metal	Nonmetallic	Flammable
Metal	0.5	1.0	2.0
Nonmetallic	1.0	1.0	2.5
Flammable	2.0	2.5	3.0

Table H.5(b) Determination of Structure Contents Coefficient C₃

Structure Contents	C ₃
Low value and nonflammable	0.5
Standard value and nonflammable	1.0
High value, moderate flammability	2.0
Exceptional value, flammable, computer or electronics	3.0
Exceptional value, irreplaceable cultural items	4.0

C2 - Structural Coefficients			
Structure	Roof		
	Metal	Nonmetallic	Flammable
Mettal	0.5	1	2
Nonmetallic	1	1	2.5
Flammable	2	2.5	3

Structure Contents	C3
Low value and nonflammable	0.5
Standard value and nonflammable	1
High value, moderate flammability	2
Exceptional value, flammable, computer and electronics	3
Exceptional value, Irreplaceable cultural items	4

Coefficient Values: C4 & C5; Occupancy & consequences

Table H.5(c) Determination of Structure Occupancy Coefficient C_4

Structure Occupancy	C_4
Unoccupied	0.5
Normally Occupied	1.0
Difficult to evacuate or risk of panic	3.0

Table H.5(d) Determination of Lightning Consequence Coefficient C_5

Lightning Consequence	C_5
Continuity of facility services not required, no environmental impact	1.0
Continuity of facility services required, no environmental impact	5.0
Consequences to the environment	10.0

Structural Occupancy Coefficient	C4
Unoccupied	0.5
Normally occupied	1
Difficult to evacuate or risk of panic	3

Lightning Consequence Coefficient	C5
Continuity of facility service not required, no environmental impact	1
continuity of facility service required, no environmental impact	5
Consequences to the environment	10

Risk Calculation

- CCTV pole flash density location = 6
- Environmental Coefficient = 2
- Equivalent collective area = 0.000254 km^2
- Average annual frequency of a direct flash (**Nd**) = **3.048×10^{-3}**

Matching the average annual frequency to the tolerable occurrence (**Nc**) which = **2×10^{-3}**

Risk Assessment Review

Assessment Results for lightning :

- If $N_d > N_c$ Lightning Protection is required.
- Coefficients values can be viewed on the next slides.

$$N_d = 3.048 \times 10^{-3} > N_c = 2 \times 10^{-3}$$


We see that the average annual frequency of a direct flash measures at a high risk.

➔ Which in fact calls for a lightning protection system.


Scenarios to consider: Lightning strike location

Source of damage:

- Ⓢ1 Flash to the structure
- Ⓢ2 Flash near to the structure
- Ⓢ3 Flash to the service connected to the structure
- Ⓢ4 Flash near the service connected to the structure



Scenarios to consider: Lightning strike location




Important note

SPD current is always the so called I_{total} in this presentation. This means that it is the sum of all currents flowing from ground to any conductive wires (or reverse) irrespectively of their function. For correct SPD selection, number of connections must be indentified and considered (Line, Neutral, twisted pair, coaxial etc...)

SPD installation is not addressed here and could be another topic to address (location inside the cabinet, Ground plane use, ground wire length etc...)

Grounding and bounding techniques are not addressed either in this presentation.

Scenario S2b with balanced ground's resistances



Ground Potential Rise (GPR)

Current in ground

Current in SPD if Grounds bounded

Current in SPD if Grounds not bounded


Hypothesis:

A. Grounds are **bounded** or

B. Grounds are **not bounded**

C. $G1 = G2 = G3 = \text{few ohms (ex: } 20\Omega\text{)}$


Scenario S2b with unbalanced ground's resistances



Hypothesis:

- A. Grounds are **bounded** or
- B. Grounds are **not bounded**
- C. $G1 = G2 = G3 = \text{few ohms (ex: } 20\Omega\text{)}$

Scenario S2a with balanced ground's resistances



Ground Potential Rise (GPR)

Current in ground


Current in SPD if Grounds bounded

Current in SPD if Grounds not bounded

Hypothesis:


- A. Grounds are **bounded** or
- B. Grounds are **not bounded**
- C. $G1 = G2 = G3 = \text{few ohms (ex: } 20\Omega\text{)}$

Scenario S2a with balanced ground's resistances




Scenario S1

- If separation distance is achieved, there is no need for extra protection at the camera's location. This means that several feet of air distance or clearance are between down conductor and other conductive parts (distance is depending of lightning current): For example and for a 50' pole, if 100kA lightning current is considered, a minimum of 2 feet air distance is necessary and 2 to 4 feet of insulating means (depending on material),
- If separation distance is not achieved, bounding of the camera to the down conductor is requested and SPD able to handle direct lightning current is necessary at Camera's location.



NOTE: If lower lightning current is considered, separation distance can easily be achieved by using non conductive housing and/or class 2 equipments . In that case, the most common risk is covered but more severe direct lightning current will lead to the total destruction of the camera (SPD in cabinet being still necessary to protect the other part of the system). This scenario being rare, it is still my recommendation.


Scenario S1: Some values



From various field survey and statistical analysis, one can assume that typical di/dt of the lightning current can be from around thousands of amperes per μsec to several hundreds of kilo Amperes per μsec . It is common to use medians as a parameter for simulation. It has to be noted that depending on the type of lightning (positive, negative, ascendant and descendant) and depending on the strike we consider.


Let's pick **$10\text{kA}/\mu\text{s}$** to ease our calculation for an example...

Scenario S1: Some values



Inductance of a wire can be set approximately from 0.1 to few μH per meter (3'). When there is an attempt to estimate the impedance of the path from the air terminal to ground, it is then depending on the type of down conductor (shape), number of down conductor and if the pole can be considered itself as a down conductor... Let's use **$0.5\mu\text{H}$ per meter** to ease the calculation. This leads to estimate the total inductance of our traffic pole to **$8\mu\text{H}$** (Pole high is 16m).

Scenario S1: Some values




If we consider, that no SPD is installed at top of the pole, we can assume that the voltage between the down conductor and the equipment that is connected to an SPD in the bottom pole cabinet will be of 80kV.


$$U = L \cdot \frac{di}{dt} = 8\mu H \cdot \frac{10kA}{1\mu s}$$

$$U = 80,000V = 80kV$$


Some statistics




di/dt_{max} (kA/ms)				Occurrence
	First negative	95%	50%	5%
	Subsequent negative	12	40	120
	First positive	0.2	2.4	32



Considering our pole when S1 occurs




Voltage (kV)	First negative Subsequent negative	95%	50%	5%	Occurrence
		44	96	256	81%




Air distance breakdown in controlled environment

Example of test performed to determine arcing distance between 2 conductive parts when an impulse voltage is applied (approximately 1 μ sec)



1: support insulator; 2: Electrode of metal rods 8 mm diameter; 3: Gap distance s

Air distance breakdown in controlled environment




$$U \approx \frac{2s}{1+k} \cdot \left(630 + \frac{590}{\Delta t}\right)$$

$$s \approx \frac{(1+k) \cdot \Delta t \cdot U}{2 \cdot (630 \cdot \Delta t + 590)}$$


Various models can be applied here but this one gives a good idea of the distance to expect a breakdown when considering a lightning overvoltage.
($\Delta t=2$ and $k=0,3$)

Once can estimate the distance breakdown on a surface material as equal if the material is not conductive and clean. In practice a coefficient up to 2 can be applied. For example, the safety distance for concrete will be set to 1.4 m for 1000 kV surge voltage.

Air breack down distance



Close up on equipment installation at top of the pole: bounded




In that type of installation a local SPD is highly recommended. Surge rating of this SPD must consider the partial lightning current conducted through bounding.

Uwithstand = Equipment withstand (manufacturer declaration)

Example in this system : $U_w \text{ camera} = 2\text{kV}$

Risk of destruction can be estimated to 99.9% of occurring events if no additional measures are taken (such as SPD installation)

Close up on equipment installation at top of the pole: floating




In that type of installation, the camera fixture may be insulating material to have a better control of the insulation between active parts (camera's internals) and the conductive housing.

$U_{withstand} = Fct$ (capacitive coupling and/or distance)

Example in this system : U_w camera = 50kV

Risk of destruction can be estimated to 90% of occurring events if no additional measures are taken (such as SPD installation)

Close up on equipment installation at top of the pole: Separation distance



Static charges can accumulate and a means to evacuate these is highly recommended (via the ground wire of the camera).

The selection, installation or routing of the wires is to be considered in order to not break the insulation property of the system.

$U_{withstand} = Fct$ (separation distance and/or Insulation withstand)

Example in this system : U_w camera = 600kV (if 60cm) and considering some safety margin)

Risk of destruction can be estimated to 10 to 20% of occurring events.

Sum up for equipment installation at top of the pole



Separation distance

- Uwithstand is depending on distance/creepage but can be in the range of worst case expected voltage (our example: 600kV).
- SPDs at top are not existing.
- For our example, large majority of lightning events are covered (80to 90%).



Floating


- Uwithstand is depending on distance/creepage but inside the top enclosure and will be limited by the size of the enclosure itself (our example: 50kV)..
- SPDs at top could be needed
- For our example, few lightning events are covered (10%)



Bounded

- Uwithstand is the one declared for the equipment to protect (our example: 2kV)
- SPDs at top are requested and surge rating of this SPD must consider the partial lightning current conducted through the bounding (hundreds of kA)
- For our example, almost all lightning events would destroy the equipment if no SPD!

Down connection along the pole (if S1)



Recommendations

- ✓ SPDs are requested to be installed on each conductive wires/circuitry as soon as a local ground is present and/or equipment have to be protected...
- ✓ Ground bounding is highly recommended to avoid any SPDs over sizing.
- ✓ If S1 (direct lightning on the pole) is considered, selection of SPDs will cover the other scenarios (nearby lightning strike).
Note: More than 500ft of ground bounding becomes useless (depending of the shape of the wire, soil resistivity and other complex parameters).
- ✓ Lower the ground resistance of the lightning pole is, lower the current to expect in the system is (SPD sizing).
- ✓ When S1 is not considered, balancing the locale ground resistance is recommended (+ bounding). Lower ground resistance value will possibly be requested by other needs but not because of surge protection 's. Distance has also some impact in this analysis.
- ✓ If S1 is considered, applying the separation distance is preferable if possible to achieve. It is highly recommended to avoid loops between various wires connecting top to bottom equipments. Shielding or twisting these is a recommendation.
- ✓ If bounding is done between top pole equipments and down conductor, SPDs are necessary even for low current direct strike. SPD can be avoided if once consider S1 to be a destructive event as this could be considered as very low probability of occurrence (nevertheless I do not recommend!)

Conclusion

- ✓ SPD installation is to be more explained to installers...
- ✓ Surge protection is more a matter of installation than SPD itself...
- ✓ If surge protection is part of the design from the beginning, it is more easy to implement and size correctly.